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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOXEY-LAYTON COMPANY, a 
corporation and LYARD McOONKIE 
and ILENE McOONKIE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
VENDETTA CLARK, HAROLD RALPHS, Case No. 14097 
TWILA JOHNSON, CECIL G. RALPHS, 
RUBY POWELL, and DENOTE RALPHS, 
being the heirs of the deceased, 
WILLIAM A. RALPHS and BERTHA RALPHS, 
his wife, and any unknown heirs of 
the deceased, WILLIAM A. RALPHS and 
BERTHA RALPHS, his wife, and DENNIE 
RALPHS and CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought an action to quiet title to certain real property, 
including the mineral rights, located in Duchesne County, Utah, and to have 
a mineral lease agreement with Defendant, Chevron Oil Company terminated. 
Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, sought to have the lease agreement upheld as 
a subsisting lease, and Defendants, Ralphs, et al, raised a counterclaim 
against Plaintiff alleging that Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers for value 
of the oil, gas, and mineral rights of the land in question and that Defendants, 
Ralphs, et al, had a superior right to 75% of said minerals. 
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DISPOSITION IN LCWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge, 
without a jury and the Court held in favor of Defendants ordering that the 
Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963, be reformed by reason of a scrivener's 
mistake to show a reservation of 75% of the mineral rights, and that 
Defendants1 counterclaim was not barred by the statutes of limitations. The 
Court further held the mineral lease with Chevron Oil Company to be valid 
and in full force and effect. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek a reversal of the trial Courts ruling, 
and for an Order that the Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963, not be changed 
or reformed at this time, that the title to the real property in question, 
including all the mineral rights be quieted in Plaintiffs and further that 
the mineral lease agreement with Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, be terminated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 7, 1962, William and Bertha Ralphs, as Sellers, entered 
into a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit #1) with Hank and Donna Swain, 
as Buyers, involving certain real property in Duchesne County. Paragraph 2 
of the contract further stated "together with an undivided 25% of oil, gas 
and mineral rights but excepting therefrom a lease now in existence". (That 
lease was terminated before the lease referred to herein as the Chevron Oil 
Company Lease, and they are not one and the same lease). 
On August 13, 1963, an amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract 
(Exhibit #2) was executed by William and Bertha Ralphs and K.C. Ranches, Inc., 
a corporation, wherein it was recited that K.C. Ranches had been assigned the 
contract interest of Swains and that Paragraph 2 of the September 7, 1962, 
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contract was being amended. There was no mention of reserving any mineral 
rights. 
Also on August 13, 1963, a Warranty Deed (Exhibit #3) was executed 
by William and Bertha Ralphs conveying the fee title to the real property, 
mentioned in the amendment to real estate contract, to K. C. Ranches, Inc. 
Again no mention was made of reserving any mineral rights, but there was 
added to the description "subject to general property taxes after September 7, 
1962". Both documents signed on August 13, 1963, were done in the presence 
of Max E. Gardner, a real estate broker, who read the documents aloud to 
William and Bertha Ralphs at the time of the execution, and who assured them 
that they were all right, although Mr. Ralphs could have read them, (R-181) 
and in fact took them or sent them to the bank at Roosevelt, Utah, to be 
escrowed (R-182-183). The Warranty Deed remained with the Bank in escrow 
until the land was paid off by Plaintiffs who then had the Deed recorded on 
May 15, 1970. 
On September 23, 1965, William and Bertha Ralphs entered in an oil, 
gas and mineral lease agreement (Exhibit #10), leasing 100% of the minerals 
involved on said real property, to Defendant Chevron Oil Company with annual 
payments of $200.00 per year payable to Lessor. William and Bertha Ralphs, 
or their heirs, have received all these payments over the years and have not 
paid or tendered any of said payments or portions thereof to K.C. Ranches, 
or to Plaintiffs. 
On November 8, 1971, William Ralphs signed an Affidavit which 
declared that he had made an error in the Deed of August 13/ 1963, because 
it did not reserve 75% of the minerals (Exhibit #13). 
On May 27, 1972, William Ralphs deeded by Quit Claim Deed to 
his heirs, Defendants in this action, 2/3rds (66 2/3%) of the mineral rights, 
which he declared was all he owned, on a substantial part of the land involved 
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in this proceeding (Exhibit #8). 
On April 21, 1967, Chevron Oil Company by letter acknowledged their 
awareness of the unrecorded Deed of August 13, 1963, in favor of K.C. Ranches, 
and Doxey-Layton Company's interest therein, and that a hold was being placed 
on the rental payments (Exhibit #9). However, Chevron Oil Company did continue 
paying the rental payments to the Ralphs each year thereafter (R-37-38). 
Doxey-Layton Company, a Utah corporation, had discovered in 1965 
that Mary Bennett, one of their employees and bookkeepers, had without 
Doxey-Layton Companyfs permission or authorization, used funds of the company 
to acquire the assets and properties of K.C. Ranches, Inc., including the 
property subject of this litigation, and Quit Claim Deeds and Assignments 
were obtained from K.C. Ranches, Inc., Mary Bennett and Carl Bennett in order 
to make partial restitution to Doxey-Layton Company (R-123). The assignment 
(Exhibit #6) dated November 4, 1965, and recorded November 8, 1965, and the 
two Quit Claim Deeds (Exhibits #4 and #5), dated December 20, 1965, and 
recorded February 15, 1966, made no mention of reservation of mineral rights. 
On May 15, 1970, Doxey-Layton Company conveyed to McConkies the 
land in question but reserved some of the minerals (Exhibit #7 and #14). 
Doxey-Layton Company had been under the impression that they had 
all the mineral rights involved with the property until about the spring of 
1970 or 1971 when conversation took place between some of the Defendants, 
heirs of William and Bertha Ralphs and the Doxeys (R-58-183-184). 
The tax records of Duchesne County show that the real property 
taxes on the property involved herein were paid by Plaintiffs, K.C. Ranches, Inc. 
or Archie Mangum frcm 1963 through 1973. Further, that no taxes for those 
years were paid by Defendants nor by William and Bertha Ralphs on said property 
(R-123-124). 
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Bertha Ralphs died August 6, 1971, at age 81 and William Ralphs 
died in January of 1973, at age 85 (R-57) and neither William nor Bertha 
Ralphs filed any legal action seeking to reform the Deed of August 13, 1963. 
On January 22, 1973, Plaintiff Doxey-Layton Company filed its 
action to quiet title to the property involved in the Deed of August 13, 1963, 
and in the allegations Plaintiff stated that Defendants "may claim seme right, 
title and interest in and to 75% of the mineral rights" (R-2). 
On February 20, 1973, Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, filed its 
answer, crossclaim and counterclaim setting forth that William and Bertha 
Ralphs had died prior to cenmencement of that action and that the heirs of 
William and BertJia Ralphs as well as Lyard and Ilene McConkie should be ordered 
to interplead their respective claims or interests (R-8). 
Plaintiff, Doxey-Layton Company, then filed an amended Complaint 
on April 11, 1973, to include the McConkies as Parties Plaintiffs, and pursuant 
to stipulation of counsel (RIO, 27). 
Then after Defendants Ralphs' answer, counterclaim and crossclaim 
was filed on June 12, 1973, setting forth who the heirs of William and Bertha 
Ralphs were, counsel for Plaintiffs filed a second amended Complaint on 
June 19, 1973, setting forth the heirs (R-20). 
The Court granted Plaintiffs' Motion to so amend on July 12, 1973 
(R-32). 
Also, Plaintiffs filed, on June 19, 1973, their Reply to Defendants' 
Ralphs Counterclaim (which had only alleged that Plaintiffs were not bona 
fide purchasers for value of the mineral rights (R-17,19). Plaintiffs' Reply 
set forth affirmative defenses to Defendants' Counterclaim, including the 
statutes of limitations (R-24), and there has been no responsive pleading 
by Defendants to the limitation of actions defense. 
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Counsel for Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based 
upon the pleadings and upon the written memorandums and argument submitted 
(R-63,102). The Court denied the Motion, and the case was tried on March 
18, 1975. In that trial the Parties stipulated essentially to the exhibits 
and the facts as set forth herein (R-122-124). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT DEFENDANTS CLAIM OF MISTAKE AND REFORMATION OF THE 
AUGUST 13, 1963 DEED WAS BARRED BY THE STATUTES OF LIMI-
TATIONS, AND IN FURTHER FINDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF 
ESTOPPEL IN PAIS WAS APPLICABLE -
The statute that seems most applicable in this case is the three 
year Statute of Limitations as contained in 78-12-26 (3) Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended. It states: 
"Within three years: . . an action for relief on the 
ground of fraud or mistake; but the cause of action in such 
case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery 
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud 
or mistake." 
The stipulated facts show that Plaintiffs, through the Warranty 
Deed of August 13, 1963, received all the fee title, including all the min-
erals, on the real property shown in said Deed. This Warranty Deed was 
prepared by William and Bertha Ralphs or their agents and signed by them 
on the date it bears. K. C. Ranches, Inc., a corporation, was the Grantee, 
and it subsequently conveyed by Quit Claim Deed all of the right title and 
interest, including the mineral rights to Doxey-Layton Company, two years 
later in 1965. Said Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963 was placed with the 
bank in escrow by William Ralphs, and out of their control and possession. 
Now, over 10 years later, the heirs of William and Bertha Ralphs 
claim an error was made in not reserving the minerals in the original Warranty 
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Deed, and further claim that Plaintiffs were not bona fide purchasers for 
value of the mineral rights. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs submits that Defendants are barred by this 
three year Statute of Limitations. 
The real question here is when does the three year statute com-
mence to run in this case, or in other words, when are the Ralphs charged 
with the discovery of the alleged mistake? 
The heirs of William and Bertha Ralphs seek to excuse the mistake, 
if indeed it was, by the fact that William and Bertha Ralphs did not read, 
themselves, the Warranty Deed and the Amendment to Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract on August 13, 1963 before signing it. 
Appellants argue that the law is clear that the failure to read the 
documents being signed when the Ralphs themselves had the documents prepared, 
were not deceived by the Grantee, and the knowledge of what they contained or 
should have contained was easily accessible, it does not excuse one from such 
alleged mistake. 
In 13 Am Jur 2nd, Section 34, Page 525 the law is stated: 
"Equity will not relieve one from the burden of a contract 
entered into by reason of a mistake resulting from negligence 
where the means of knowledge were easily accessible. This is 
particularly true where the mistake was due to a person's 
failure to read, or have read to him, the instrument he was 
executing and there are no special circumstances excusing his 
failure to make himself acquainted with the contents of the 
instrument, such as a confidential relationship existing between 
him and the other party, or the general reputation of the other 
party." 
Again in 17 Am Jur 2nd, Section 149 at Page 498, we read: 
"Failure to read a contract before signing it will not, as 
a rule, affect its binding force. Indeed, the Courts appear to 
be unanimous in holding that a person who, having the capacity 
and an opportunity to read a contract, is not mislead as to its 
contents and who sustains no confidential relationship to the 
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other party cannot avoid the contract on the ground of mistake 
if he signs it without reading it, at least in the absence of 
special circumstances excusing his failure to read it. It is 
the duty of every contracting party to learn and knew its con-
tents before he signs and delivers it, and if the contract is 
plain and unequivocal in its terms, he is ordinarily bound 
thereby. To permit a party, when sued on a written contract, 
to admit that he signed it but to deny that it expresses the 
agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it 
but did not read it or know its stipulations would absolutely 
destroy the value of all contracts." 
Our case here is even stronger on this point, for Max Gardner, Real 
Estate Broker, friend and agent of William and Bertha Ralphs read aloud the 
Warranty Deed and the Amendment to Contract to the Ralphs and gave them sane 
assurances (R-189). 
It is also anything but clear from the evidence and exhibits in this 
case that there was in fact a mistake as to the mineral rights. The Warranty 
Deed and Amendment to Contract (exhibits #2 and #3), and the Assignment and 
Quit Claim Deeds from K. C. Ranches to Doxeys (exhibits #4, #5 and #6) would 
indicate otherwise. Also the testimony of Defendants own witnesses, Mr. 
Gardner and Mrs. Powell, that Doxeys understood that they had all the mineral 
rights in the property as late as 1970 or 1971 (R-184; 195) would indicate 
otherwise. Furthermore, the fact that William and Bertha Ralphs attempted to 
convey 25% of the minerals to the Swains by contract in 1962, 100% of the same 
minerals to K. C. Ranches, Inc. by Deed and Amended Contract in August, 1963 
(and it is interesting to note that no assignment document of the Swain con-
tract from Swains to K. C. Ranches was ever produced in the case), 100% of the 
same minerals to Chevron Oil Company by lease in September, 1965 (exhibit #10), 
and 66 2/3% of these same mineral rights to their heirs in May, 1972 (exhibit #8), 
even after preparing an affidavit in 1971 wherein William Ralphs stated he had 
75% of the minerals (exhibit #13), would lead one to believe that William and 
Bertha Ralphs were never sure what they intended to convey or reserve in the 
way of minerals. That is why the self serving, improper and hearsay testimony 
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of Max Gardner, who the Ralphs were apparently relying on in this transaction 
and as their agent could have some responsibility and obligation for damages 
to Defendants, should have been stricken by the trial court, when he testified 
what Mr. Bennett agreed to or understood (for K. C. Ranches, Inc.) relative 
to the mineral rights (R-18, 185, 186). 
We submit, also, that the Utah Case of McKellar v. McKellar, (1969) 
23 UT. 2nd 106, 458 P. 2nd 867 stands for the proposition that the tijne of the 
discovery of an alleged mistake on a one page Deed under the three year limita-
tion statute, Section 78-12-26(3) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is at the date of 
the Deed was executed. The Court stated: 
"The critical issue resolves around the time of discovery 
of the mistake . . . " 
The Court further comments: 
"In this action, Plaintiffs have not alleged that there was 
any conduct on the part of the Defendant or her husband wtiich 
prevented the Grantors from ascertaining the contents of the 
ueeci . . • 
Then the Court sums up the case as follows: 
"Although Plaintiffs have not pleaded the circumstances that 
contributed to the alleged unawareness of the grantors at the 
time when they executed the conveyance of 1947, the rule stated 
by the court in Hjermstad v. Barkuloo is relevant: 
'It is a general rule that a party will not be relieved, 
either by a court of equity or a court of law, where he 
executes an instrument without reading it, when he has it 
in his hands and negligently fails to ascertain the contents 
of it; the other party not being quilty of any deceit or 
false representations as to its contents, by means of which 
he is put off his guard.' " 
The case at bar is very similar to the McKellar case, and William and 
Bertha Ralphs knew, or indeed should have known, if there actually was a mistake 
involved in the August 1963 Deed, of the relevant facts which a reasonable dili-
gence or inquiry on their part would have revealed, thus the Defendants, as 
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their heirs, should be estopped from claiming the three year statute has not 
run. (See also the Utah case of Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 UT. 2nd 152; 349 JP 
2nd 1112,1116). 
The Hjermstad v. Barkuloo (1954 Montana) 270 P 2nd 1112, case cited 
in McKellar decision also held that the Grantor, who was a college graduate with 
considerable business experience, was guilty of negligence when he failed to read 
a Deed before signing it. This is similar to the negligence of Max Gardner, agent 
for William and Bertha Ralphs, who had considerable business and real estate ex-
perience, in failing to note the absence of reservation of minerals in their 
Deed, and after reading the same aloud to the Ralphs. 
59 ALR 818, states it this way: 
"It has been held that equity assists only the vigilant, 
hence it will not relieve against mistakes, which ordinary 
care would have prevented. Conscience, good faith, and rea-
sonable diligence are necessary to call a court of equity into 
activity." 
and again at Page 819 of 59 ALR: 
"Where a mistake occurs through a party's own want of 
ordinary care, by reason of which he sustains loss, he can-
not rescind . ." 
Now counsel for Defendants, Ralphs, argued at the trial that the time 
of discovery of the mistake by Defendants, or William and Bertha Ralphs, must be 
determined as of the date of recording of the August 13, 1963 Deed, which date 
was May 15, 1970 (R-80,82) and he admits this to be the case by the recording 
statutes, 57-1-6 and 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 and the cases supporting, 
such as Smith v. Edwards, 81 UT. 244; 17 P 2nd 264, and Crcmpton v. Jenson, 
78 UT. 55; 1 P 2nd 242). By this reasoning Defendants are still barred by the 
three year limitation statute, for they did not commence "an action" within the 
three year period. Also, by this admission, Defendants should be charged with 
notice and discovery by the recording of the Assignment and two Quit Claim Deeds 
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on this same property from K. C. Ranches to Doxey-Layton Gompany by February 
15, 1966 (R-123). 
On June 12, 1973, more than three years following the discovery of 
the mistake under any of the theories, Defendants filed "an action" in the 
form of a Counterclaim against Plaintiffs, alleging that Plaintiffs were not 
bona fide purchasers for value of the mineral rights (R-19), but not at any 
time have Defendants pled to have the Deed of August 13, 1963 cancelled or 
reformed nor did thay move the Court to amend their pleadings or to conform 
to the evidence as required by the rules; nor did Defendants plead with particu-
larity mistake or error. 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint and Amended Complaints were solely for a suit 
to quiet title to the property deeded to them, and an action by Defendants to 
cancel or reform a deed (if they had so pleaded) could not be considered a part 
of Plaintiffs' original or amended pleadings. 
Section 78-12-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides: 
"Civil actions can be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action shall 
have accrued." 
A Counterclaim for cancellation or reformation of a Deed, would if 
properly pleaded, be considered a new action, not just a defense. Furthermore, 
if properly pleaded it may require a tender of restoration or return to status 
quo before such a suit could be maintained. (See 13 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 43, Page 
529). 
51 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 76, Page 655 states: 
"The ultimate purpose of a limitation law is to bar actions 
rather than to suppress or deny matters of defense. Hence, as 
a general rule, limitation statutes are not applicable to de-
fenses but apply only where affirmative relief is sought." 
At Sec. 78, Page 657 of 51 Am. Jur. 2nd, it further states: 
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 In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a demand 
pleaded by way of a set off, counterclaim, or cross claim 
is regarded as an affirmative action in most jurisdictions 
and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject 
to the operation of the statute of limitations, and is un-
available if barred." 
In the case of Mauian Hotel, Inc. v. Naui Pineapple Co. (1971 
Hawaii Case) 481 P 2nd 310 the Court states: 
"Counterclaims, as with all other claims, will relate 
back only if they arose out of a situation previously de-
scribed in timely pleadings." 
Defendants1 Counterclaim if "an action" at all can only be considered 
an affirmative new action for reformation of a deed (R-138) which could not 
relate back to Plaintiffs1 Gomplaint, and certainly was not a compulsory counter-
claim as found by the Trial Court. 
See also Strong v. Strong, 22 Cal. 2nd 540; 140 P 2nd 386, and 
Hblton v. Jackson, 184 Ky. 559; 212 S.W. 587) 
The Trial Court also erred in holding that the doctrine of "Equitable 
Estoppel", or "Estoppel in Pais" was applicable in this case, as a basis for 
holding that the statutes of limitations were not a bar to Defendants1 Counter-
claim (R-144). 
In its Findings of Fact, the Trial Court stated (R-137): 
"The doctrine of "Estoppel in Pais" is applicable inas-
much as the Defendants1 counsel was waiting for the Plaintiffs1 
counsel to file a further Amended Complaint in the litigation 
prior to the said Defendants filing their Answer and Counter-
claim herein." 
New counsel for Plaintiffs has set out step by step in the facts of 
this Brief the record of the pleadings and the filing thereof, which we refer 
the Court to for purposes of this argument, and said pleadings speak for them-
selves . 
Counsel for Defendants did not raise the issue and doctrine of Equit-
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able Estoppel in his pleadings, but it was first raised in argument before the 
Trial Judge. There was no evidence taken, no proof offered on the question, and 
Plaintiffs1 counsel refused to stipulate to the statements made by counsel in his 
argument as he could not agree with the same (R-206,207). 
The law is clear that the doctrine cannot be applied in these circum-
stances. 
In 28 Am. Jur. 2nd, Sec. 36, Page 642 it states: 
". . .it is still the rule that estoppels must be certain 
to every intent and are not to be taken or sustained by mere 
argument or doubtful inference. No party ought to be precluded 
from making out his case according to its truth unless by force 
of sane positive principle of law. Hence, the doctrine of estoppel 
in pais must be applied strictly and should not be enforced unless 
substantiated in every particular. It will not be deemed to arise 
from facts which are ambiguous and subject to more than one con-
struction, and nothing can be supplied by mere intendment. The 
acts, claims, or conduct relied on to estop must be plainly incon-
sistent with the right afterward set up and must clearly appear 
to have been done or made by the party whcm it is sought to bind." 
Again none of the essential elements or proof is present in this case 
to apply this doctrine. 
In 28 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 35, Page 640 all the elements required to be 
proved are set forth: 
"Broadly speaking, the essential elements of an equitable 
estoppel or estoppel in pais, as related to the party to be 
estopped, are: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representa-
tion or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is 
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise 
than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently 
attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expecta-
tion, that such conduct will be acted upon by, or influence, 
the other party or other persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the real facts. And broadly speaking, as re-
lated to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential elements 
are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the 
truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, 
upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and 
(3) action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to 
change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, 
to his injury, detriment, or prejudice. Whether these elements 
are present, and whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel should 
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therefore be applied, in a particular case, depends, of 
course, upon the facts and circumstances of that case, and 
manifestly, there can be no equitable estoppel if any essen-
tial element thereof is lacking or is not satisfactorily 
proved. 
(See also 28 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 147, Page 826, on necessity of proof, 
and the case of Barber v. Anderson, 73 UT. 357; 274 P. 136, as to the necessity 
of a sufficient allegation and plea of an estoppel in pais). 
Now, none of the essential elements are present in this case for the 
Court to have applied the doctrine, and it was certainly error, in any event, 
to hold an estoppel in pais was present to bar the running of the Statutes of 
Limitations without the same having been pleaded or any evidence or proof taken 
thereon. 
Although the main argument in Appellants1 Brief has been on the three 
year limitation statute, it is nevertheless the contention of Appellants that 
the Cburt erred in not ruling as a matter of law that Defendants were barred 
in asserting their Counterclaim by reason of the other statutes set out as a 
defense by Plaintiffs in their Reply. These statutes include 78-12-5; 78-12-6; 
78-12-23(2); 78-12-25(2); and 78-12-7 through 78-12-12 (involving adverse pos-
session) and the Court is referred to counsel's argument on these matters as 
set out in Plaintiffs1 Memorandum Brief filed with the Trial Court (R-63-71). 
Furthermore it appears to counsel for Plaintiffs that if Defendants 
claim that the bar of these Statutes of Limitations was tolled or otherwise 
inapplicable, they must be required to plead and prove the same, and this they 
have not done. 
(See Clawson v. Boston Acme Mines Development Co. 72 UT. 137; 269 
P. 147). 
The Court, therefore, should have held as a matter of law that Defen-
dants1 claim of mistake and reformation of the August 13, 1963 Deed was barred 
by the Statutes of Limitations. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW BASED UPON IMPROPER AND HEARSAY EVIDENCE ALLOWED INTO 
THE RECORD. 
Paragraph 3 (R-133) of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact states that 
on August 13/ 1963, between K. C. Ranches, Inc. and the Ralphs: 
"It was mutually agreed that the only purpose of said amend-
ment was to correct the aforesaid erroneous legal description." 
Paragraph 10 (R-134) of the Findings states: 
"The President of K. C. Ranches, Inc., namely Carl Bennett, 
while in the presence of Max Gardner, did assure the Ralphs that 
everytliing would remain the same as in the original contract in-
cluding mineral rights, and that the only change that the parties 
were making was to correct the erroneous legal description." 
Paragraph 12 (R-134) of the Findings states: 
"It was the specific intention of the Ralphs and of K. C. 
Ranches, Inc. that the amendment to Uniform Real Estate Contract 
and the Warranty Deed dated August 13, 1963, only correct the 
erroneous legal description and not alter or change positions 
between the Ralphs as sellers and K. C. Ranches, Inc. as purchasers, 
relative to the ownership of mineral rights." 
The Findings of the Trial Gourt, as mentioned in Paragraphs 8, 10 and 
12 above quoted are based entirely upon improper or hearsay evidence at the 
trial, over the objections of counsel for Plaintiffs, and should not have been 
allowed. It was upon their testimony that the Court must have determined there 
was a scrivener's mistake in the Warranty Deed of August 13, 1963, for the docu-
ments themselves do not show the intention of the parties to have mistakenly 
left out a reservation of mineral rights. 
The only evidence in the record of any conversations, understandings 
or agreements between the deceased persons, William and Bertha Ralphs, and K.C. 
Ranches, Inc., who was never served or brought in as a party to the action, was 
the testijnony of Max Gardner (R-178-191). It was Max Gardner, who was the 
personal friend and Real Estate Broker of William and Bertha Ralphs, and who 
may have some personal liability or responsibility to Defendants in his handling 
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of the transaction and assurances given in 1963 (R-189). His testimony, at 
best, must be colored and self serving. There was no other corroborating testi-
mony by any other witnesses. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs had a standing objection before the Court on 
hearsay evidence (R-176), and again counsel sought to have Max Gardner's testi-
mony stricken on these hearsay conversations, (R-185) and that there was no way of 
exaraining the absent and deceased parties of what was in their minds, what, they 
knew or whether they had even read the agreements (R-186). The Court, however, 
denied Plaintiffs1 motions and objections. 
Max Gardner testified at Page 181 of the record: 
"Q. (By Mr. Mangan) All Right. Now at that time was there 
a conversation relative to why this Amendment had to be signed?" 
"A. We discussed this there, and Mr. Bennett agreed that 
what he was getting was the approximate number of acres. The 
only thing that was being changed was the legal description that 
was in error, that everything else would be the same on the con-
tract as the contract stated, including the mineral rights." 
Again at Page 190 of the record, Max Gardner testified: 
"Q. And did Mr. Bennett understand that when he was there?" 
(Referring to the mineral rights) 
"A. Yes, he certainly did." 
What was agreed to and understood by Mr, Bennett, or whether he was 
speaking, agreeing or understanding for K. C. Ranches, Inc. was a matter of 
conjecture and was improper and hearsay testimony, and the documents speak for 
themselves. 
The Court, however, seemed to allow this testimony on the basis that 
Plaintiffs stood in the shoes of K. C. Ranches, Inc. The Court stated at page 
176 of the record: 
"Well, I'm going to, Mr. Young, I'm going to permit that 
evidence, and if it's not proper evidence, I'll . . . you can 
make a motion to strike at the conclusion of the whole thing. 
You won't have to make your motion to strike each time and so 
on. But I'm doing it on the theory that Doxey-Layton stands 
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exactly the same shoes as K. C. Ranches and that if the K. C. 
Ranches were a party to this action that that evidence would 
be admissible. If we are wrong about that, that's something 
that somebody else can do scmething about." 
Under the "Rules of Evidence" as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court, 
July 1, 1971, Rule 63 covers hearsay evidence as follows: 
"Evidence of a statement which is made other than by a 
witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the 
truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and inadmissible 
except:" 
Therefore, the statements testified to by Max Gardner of Mr. Bennett's 
thoughts, agreements or understandings or of William and Bertha Ralphs1, was 
clearly hearsay unless it can be brought within any of the exceptions of the 
rule. None of the exceptions seem to apply, however. As to Doxey-Layton Gom-
pany being in the same shoes as K. C. Ranches and treating Plaintiffs as though 
K. C. Ranches, Inc. was a party, we fail to see the reasoning behind this. 
Doxey-Layton Company was just one of the Plaintiffs in the action, and there 
was certainly no agency or representative capacity existing between any of 
the Plaintiffs and K. C. Ranches, Inc. or Mr. and Mrs. Carl Bennett. Doxeys 
had become unwilling purchasers of the property throught the wrongful conduct 
of Mrs. Bennett, and whether Carl Bennett properly represented K. C. Ranches 
Corporation is questionable. Mary Bennett even signed as guardian of Carl 
Bennett on the Deed of December 20, 1965, (Exhibit #5). So to allow statements 
of a person not a party, and whose association with the corporation is questionable, 
and without the right and opportunity to cross examine as to the corporate under-
standing or agreement (beyond the writing or document) is improper and wrong. 
Without this improper and hearsay evidence of Max Gardner, there is 
really nothing in the record to substantiate a mistake, or that it was in fact 
the intention of William and Bertha Ralphs to reserve the minerals in their 
Deed to K. C. Ranches of August 13, 1963. Since William and Bertha Ralphs had 
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conveyed away different amounts of the same mineral rights to different parties 
on at least four separate occasions, previously mentioned herein (page 8), and 
since William Ralphs was about 83 years of age when he signed the Affidavit 
prepared for him in 1971, and since neither William or Bertha Ralphs ever 
attempted, themselves, to file a claim in reference to the said mineral rights, 
there is no clear intention shown, and the Trial Court should have upheld the 
Deed of August 13, 1963 in view of the 10 year period of time that elapsed. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE CHEVRON OIL 
COMPANY LEASE MAY BE TERMINATED BY PLAINTIFFS. 
William and Bertha Ralphs conveyed all the fee title, including oil 
and gas and minerals to K. C. Ranches, Inc. on August 13, 1963, which title 
subsequently was acquired by Plaintiffs. Although the August 13, 1963 Deed was 
placed in escrow and out of the control of the Ralphs, it was not recorded until 
May 15, 1970. However, K. C. Ranches, Inc. took possession of the land involved 
in the Deed in August, 1963 and Doxeys acquired possession in the Fall of 1965. 
On September 23, 1965, more than two years following the execution of 
the Warranty Deed to K. C. Ranches, Inc., William and Bertha Ralphs entered into 
an oil, gas and mineral lease (Exhibit #10), with Defendant Chevron Oil Company. 
Said lease granted rights in favor of Chevron Oil to the lands already conveyed 
to K. C. Ranches, and it involved 100% of the minerals for a 10 year period, with 
$200.00 per year rental payments going to the Ralphs. 
Although Chevron Oil Company may have checked the recorded records of 
ownership, they must not have checked out the actual possessors of the land when 
they entered into the lease agreement with the Ralphs. 
It is therefore Appellants1 contention that they are the fee owners of 
the land in question including all the oil, gas and mineral rights, and that 
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inasmuch as no lease agreement exists between them and Chevron Oil Company, the 
Appellants have a right to terminate or void the lease involving said minerals 
and have title quieted in than. 
We submit that the law is clear that the landowner is entitled to the 
surface and all that is below it, and when there is no reservation of mineral 
rights in a Deed, (as in Ralphs Deed to K. C. Ranches and to Plaintiffs) , every-
thing is conveyed. So when William and Bertha Ralphs leased minerals, oil and 
gas rights, to Chevron Oil Company two years after their Deed to K. C. Ranches, 
There was nothing to lease or convey. (See 38 Am.Jur. 2nd Sec. 14, pages 493-
495; also Re Hart's Estate 151 Cal. App. 2nd 171; 311 P 2nd 605) 
38 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 16, page 496 states as follows: 
"To make an absolute conveyance of seme or all of his 
interests in land, the landowner, may, of course, use a Deed. 
A conveyance of land without any restrictions, limitations, 
exceptions, or reservations would include all minerals and 
mineral rights." 
Counsel for Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, agrues in his memorandum 
to the Trial Court (R-116-121) that paragraph 7 of the lease agreement (Exhibit 
#10) allows the oil company to make its lease payments per the agreement, unless 
certified copies of the recorded instruments showing the interest or title to be 
elsewhere, are received by the company, and than counsel cites several cases. 
Said paragraph 7 of the lease and the cases referred to only go to the question 
of assignment or change in ownership by the Lessor after the lease is entered 
into, not before. 
In our particular case Ralphs had conveyed away their ownership two 
years prior to executing the lease with Chevron Oil Company. Therefore, when 
Chevron Oil received actual notice of the unrecorded Deed of August 13, 1963 as 
shown by their admission and letter of April 21, 1967 (Exhibit #9), about four 
years prior to their obtaining a small producing well in the area, we submit 
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that said Defendant could not just ignore the fact and say they were not on 
notice of Plaintiffs1 title. Also, Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, by their 
letter of April 21, 1967 to Doxey-Layton Co. and Mr. Archie Mangum (who was on 
the property at the tine), stated that they were placing "a hold" on the rental 
payments pending a furnishing of the recording information, yet Chevron Oil 
continued to make the lease payments to the Ralphs, and none of these payments, 
or any portion thereof, have been paid or tendered to Plaintiffs or to K. C. 
Ranches, Inc. 
For these reasons it appears that Chevron Oil Company and the Ralphs 
have not acted in good faith, as affecting Plaintiffs1 rights surrounding the 
oil and gas and minerals here, and Plaintiffs should be entitled to have the lease 
voided or terminated and title quieted in said Plaintiffs. If it were otherwise, 
Defendant, Chevron Oil Company, could, under the terms of the lease, go on indef-
initely, and without rental payments, so long as they produced even a very small 
amount from the well drilled.( See Exhibit #10, paragraph 2) 
38 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 20, Page 501 we read: 
"Generally, for a purchaser of interests relating to gas and 
oil to be protected against claims based upon unrecorded transfers 
he must have acted in good faith and without either actual or con-
structive notice. Thus, a person who purchases or leases land in 
the face of information indicating that the transferor's title is 
imperfect or that the land or an interest therein has already been 
transferred to a third person, cannot be said to be an innocent 
purchaser or lessor; consequently, the courts will not accord him 
the rights of such an innocent person." 
Chevron Oil Company may have entered into their lease with William and 
Bertha Ralphs in good faith in 1965 by reason of the record title, but when they 
received actual notice and a copy of the unrecorded Deed of August 13, 1963, 
showing that Ralphs had no mineral interest to convey or lease to them, then 
Chevron Oil either acted in bad faith by continuing lease payments to the Ralphs 
and taking a chance to put a producing well on the property four years later, or 
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they must have contacted Ralphs about the Deed of 1963 and gotten from them 
their alleged claim of mistake or error. In either event, when Chevron Oil 
Company had actual notice in April, 1967, they were not hurt except for perhaps 
one or two lease payments, which Plaintiffs are not asking for. Counsel for 
Plaintiffs therefore submits that Chevron Oil cannot now claim an indefinite 
valid and subsisting lease, as affecting Plaintiff, by reason of the small pro-
ducing well, or by reason of estoppel or the recording statutes, after having 
ignored the facts and the notice given them. Appellants should therefore be 
entitled to void or terminate the lease entered into. 
CONCLUSION 
When William and Bertha Ralphs executed the Warranty Deed of August 
13, 1963 without limitation or reservation of mineral rights, after having the 
Deed read to then as to its correctness, and having failed to bring any action 
for mistake or reformation or cancellation of said Deed for over 10 years, the 
heirs of said William and Bertha Ralphs should be barred by reason of the Statutes 
of Limitations from now changing the Deed, and the lease agreement entered into 
by the said Ralphs with Chevron Oil Company regarding 100% of the oil, gas and 
mineral rights, should be allowed to be voided or terminated by Plaintiffs. 
The decision of the Trial Court with respect to these matters should 
therefore be reversed and the title to the property, including the mineral rights, 
should be quieted in Appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GAYLEN S. YOUNG, JR. 
Attorney for Plaitiffs-Appellants 
2188 Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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